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ABSTRACT  
   
Intelligence, consisting of critical products that facilitate law enforcement 
decision-making, is a crucial component and tool in the criminal justice system. 
However, the ways in which intelligence is gathered and used has gone largely 
unevaluated, particularly at the local level of law enforcement. This thesis begins to 
address the sparsity of literature by investigating the Intelligence Officer function in the 
Phoenix Police Department. More specifically, this study explores their roles; perceptions 
on information they are gathering, namely reliability and validity; and their effectiveness 
in terms of both intelligence and case successes. Different aspects of roles and 
perceptions are also examined in terms of their ability to predict these outcomes. Data 
reflect a 22-month sample of officer reports from the Phoenix Police Department 
Intelligence Officer Program. Descriptive analyses suggest that Intelligence Officers 
typically work specific cases with varied and different natures of crime. Generally, 
officers seem to be confident in the information they collect in terms of reliability and 
validity, and also appear to be relatively successful in achieving both broad intelligence 
successes and more tangible case successes. However, the relationships between role and 
perception variables and results vary in terms of both impact and significance for each 
type of success. Future research is required to better understand these relationships and to 
continue building a foundation of knowledge on Intelligence Officer effectiveness, so 
their impact can be optimized. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, intelligence, consisting of 
the “critical and substantive products that support law enforcement decision making,” has 
become a significant focus for law enforcement entities across the United States 
(Ratcliffe, 2007, p. v). The consequent focus on intelligence gathering, analysis, and 
dissemination has since permeated all aspects of law enforcement and is visible at every 
level. This is perhaps most evident at the federal level, as demonstrated by significant 
spending and increases in intelligence-based personnel. For example, $78 billion was 
invested in intelligence programs in federal year 2012 (Erwin & Belasco, 2013). Such 
investment is about twice that spent in 2001 (Erwin & Belasco, 2013). This spending 
enabled a significant rise in the number of intelligence-based personnel. The FBI’s 
training of 133 Intelligence Officers after introducing their Intelligence Officer program 
in 2005 is a direct consequence of this boost in funding (Mueller, 2011). 
However, the focus on intelligence is far from being restricted to federal agencies. 
Following the September 11 attacks, the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
(IACP) and the introduction of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) 
have both spurred significant efforts toward intelligence-led practices at the local level, 
especially intelligence-led policing (Carter, 2009). Such efforts have increased the focus 
on hiring a variety of intelligence personnel including Intelligence Analysts and 
Intelligence Officers (Carter, 2009). 
The increase of Intelligence Officers at the local level is one of the primary 
inspirations for this study as it represents a fundamental shift in how officers can be 
assigned. Responsible for utilizing intelligence processes to collect, collate, and act on 
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information, Intelligence Officers can have more responsibilities than a standard police 
officer. This is especially true when being an Intelligence Officer is an additional role. 
The increasing presence of Intelligence Officers in the policing realm has prompted a 
need to gain a better understanding of their work. Once a greater appreciation of their role 
is gained, an evaluation of effectiveness and methods of enhancing their function can 
then be explored. To date, there have been very few, if any, studies that have investigated 
the specifics of the work done by Intelligence Officers. 
The purpose of this study is to begin addressing the gap in research by answering 
three key questions regarding Intelligence Officers. First, what is the role of an 
Intelligence Officer? More specifically, what are the types and natures of the activities 
they deal with, and how do they do so? Second, how do Intelligence Officers perceive 
potential intelligence? This topic addresses what Intelligence Officers think of the 
usefulness of the information they are gathering in terms of reliability and validity. Third, 
are Intelligence Officers effective in making a meaningful contribution to a law 
enforcement agency? This is assessed in terms of the Intelligence Officers both gathering 
useful information and closing cases. In addition, this study also explores how success is 
impacted by: crime categorization, the nature of the crime, method of gathering 
information and both perceived reliability and validity. 
To address these questions, I utilize 22 months of data from the Phoenix Police 
Department Intelligence Officer program. This consists of Intelligence Officer Reports 
(IORs) submitted by Phoenix Intelligence Officers. To initiate the investigation into 
intelligence, prior research will first be addressed. This will be followed by the 
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methodology used for study, a presentation of the results and discussion of how such 
information may be used moving forward. 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
Intelligence Processes and the Intelligence Cycle 
In acknowledging intelligence as defined by Ratcliffe (2007, p. v) as consisting of 
the “critical and substantive products that support law enforcement decision making,” one 
can see that the concept is rather broad. A fundamental first step to better understanding 
this conceptualization and the application of intelligence is examining the processes by 
which intelligence personnel attack problems. This is perhaps best demonstrated by what 
is referred to as the intelligence cycle, a conceptual model consisting of four to six steps, 
depending on the organization (Larm, 2011). Regardless of the number of steps, these all 
contain the same basic requirements: planning and direction, collection, evaluation, 
collation, analysis, dissemination and reevaluation of information (Harris, 1976). 
 The process begins with a question or problem and intelligence personnel creating 
a detailed plan of how they are going to address it (Larm, 2011). In the collection phase 
that follows, personnel utilize a collection plan to gather all the data relevant to their issue 
(Coambs, 2011). All data is then collated and evaluated in terms of its potential 
usefulness.  
Evaluation of data is guided by a variety of criteria including relevance, 
reliability, and validity (Peterson, 2011a). Once the data has been organized and assessed, 
it is then analyzed. “Analysis is the logical thought process applied to the data,” which 
effectively gives it meaning (Harris, 1976, p.27). It can be used to reconstruct crimes or 
assess threats contributing to the defined problem (Peterson, 2011b). Once analysis has 
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been conducted, information pertinent to the given problem is disseminated on a right to 
know and need to know basis, in order to try and address the issue (Fowler, 2011). 
Information is then revaluated to ascertain what if any further attention the original 
problem requires. 
History of Intelligence 
With these core concepts and processes in mind, it is useful to develop an 
awareness of how the application of intelligence has developed in the United States. 
Intelligence began as a military tool utilized in the Revolutionary War and over time 
became employed by a number of federal agencies (Morehouse, 2011). Leading up to 
World War II, this function was rather fragmented and disjointed, but became more 
centralized thereafter with the creation of a number of agencies such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) (Morehouse, 
2011). 
Only in the last 70 years has intelligence begun to be gathered and utilized by 
civilian law enforcement (Morehouse, 2011). Prior to 1950’s, it was scarcely used. In the 
decade that followed, law enforcement agencies began to stress a need for intelligence 
units to deal with increases in organized crime (Morehouse, 2011). This led to the 
creation of the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU) in 1956, 
which encompassed 26 local and state law enforcement agencies (Morehouse, 2011). 
Utilization of intelligence by local law enforcement continued to grow and 
became far more widespread in the 1970’s. At this point in intelligence history, analytical 
training became available throughout the country (Morehouse, 2011). The US 
Department of Justice called for all agencies to “establish and maintain the capability to 
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gather and evaluate information” as well as disseminate it in an attempt to address 
“organized crime and public disorder” (IACP, 2005, p. 5). Thus, the 1970’s are 
recognized by many as when intelligence started to become truly incorporated into law 
enforcement practices (Johnson, 2010).  
Since then, attempts have been made to integrate intelligence into law 
enforcement, at least to some degree. The most significant change in implementation of 
intelligence came in response to terrorism within US boundaries in the aftermath of the 
attacks on September 11, 2001. Following this event, the focus on intelligence, as well as 
improving communication and coordination between agencies, escalated significantly. 
This is demonstrated by the development of the earlier mentioned NCISP. Also of great 
importance was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 and the 
restructuring of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (McGarrell, Freilich & Chermak, 
2007). 
While the overall impact of these changes has largely lacked evaluation, there are 
some studies, such as research by Schaible and Sheffield (2012), which have 
demonstrated benefits. The authors utilized survey data from 61 of the 73 state law 
enforcement agencies in 2004. Their findings indicated that there has been greater 
interaction between agencies as well as positive changes in the “organizational functions 
of intelligence, grants and planning” (Schaible & Sheffield, 2012, p. 761).  
One of the key developments that has been a catalyst for sharing has been the 
introduction of fusion centers. These hubs, which initially began forming in 2003, are 
centered around proactive sharing of raw information and data between all levels of law 
enforcement and related agencies, whether they be federal, state or local (Burch, 2008). 
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According to the Department of Homeland Security (2016), there are currently 78 fusion 
centers utilizing their relationships and resources to address intelligence gaps and protect 
the nation from a wide variety of threats.  
Traditionally, fusion centers have been focused on counterterrorism efforts and 
paid little attention to other issues. This perspective, visible in the earliest evaluation that 
began in 2011, has been changing (Department of Homeland Security, 2012). The most 
recent evaluation suggests that 76.6% of centers now consider all hazards and 96.1% 
include all-crimes in their primary mission (Department of Homeland Security, 2016). 
Still, many have yet to become involved with day-to-day policing. More generally, there 
is a notable intelligence gap at the local level. This has started to receive more attention 
after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which in turn, has largely 
revitalized the focus on the intelligence-led policing model (Ratcliffe, 2016).  
Intelligence-led Policing 
 Originating in the UK during the late 1980’s, intelligence-led policing became a 
model that expanded globally to countries such as the United States, New Zealand, 
Australia and Canada (Ratcliffe, 2008). It began as a focused attempt to combat burglary 
and motor vehicle theft by preemptively using intelligence (McGarrell et al., 2007). At 
this point it was merely viewed as a tool for targeting serious repeat offenders (Ratcliffe, 
2016). 
However, intelligence-led policing is an evolving concept with quite dramatic 
shifts (Ratcliffe, 2016, p.49). It is now a model that focuses on the utilization of 
intelligence and analysis to achieve “crime and harm reduction, disruption and prevention 
through strategic and tactical management, deployment and enforcement” (Ratcliffe, 
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2016, p.5). Much like fusion centers, it has also evolved to have an “all-crimes, all-
hazards, all-harms business approach” (Ratcliffe, 2016, p.67). As a result, it now entails 
the use of intelligence to make decisions and appropriately allocate resources to address 
both crime and terror threats (Schaible & Sheffield, 2012). 
 While this broad understanding of intelligence-led policing is a useful starting 
point, many have argued that the evidence base for its practice has yet to be fully 
established (Carter, 2013). More specifically, it has been suggested that there is 
“somewhat of a paucity of conceptual and empirical research,” especially since the 
transformation of intelligence-led policing spurred by the 9/11 attacks (Carter, 2013, p. 
1). Of particular note is the deficit of studies at both the state and local levels of law 
enforcement (Carter, 2013). Carter (2013, p. 13) highlights that these limitations need to 
be addressed specifically with a “multi-disciplinary theoretical framework” in order to 
gain an understanding of the effectiveness of intelligence processes within law 
enforcement agencies in the US. Without doing so, large deficits will remain in the 
intelligence literature. 
Intelligence Integration at the Local Level 
Despite a general scarcity of focused intelligence studies, some relevant ones on 
intelligence-led policing do exist. For example, Groff et al. (2015) conducted an 
evaluation which examined foot patrol, problem-oriented policing and offender-focused 
policing within hotspots. The concept of offender-focused policing is particularly 
relevant to intelligence-led policing and its framework (Ratcliffe, 2008). This is because 
it utilizes both crime analysis and criminal intelligence to target repeat offenders 
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(Ratcliffe, 2007). Offender-focused policing also utilizes both deterrence and 
incapacitation strategies to combat crime (Groff et al., 2015).  
The Groff et al. (2015) study was conducted with the Philadelphia Police 
Department and utilized 27 hot spots for each type of intervention. Of the hotspots, 7 
were used as control areas for each approach. All interventions lasted 12-24 weeks, 
depending on the individual hot spot. Interestingly, offender-focused policing was the 
only strategy to have a statistically significant impact on crime. It was shown to reduce 
all violent crimes by 42% and violent felonies by 50%, when compared to the control 
areas. The authors recognized that this success was partially due to the unique aspects of 
the offender-focused patrol. Groff et al. (2015) highlighted factors such as having a 
dedicated team working on a clear mission and assistance from an Intelligence Analyst. 
Overall, this crime reduction effect by an intelligence-led strategy was an important 
addition to the intelligence-led policing literature. 
Groff et al. (2015) also identified numerous other advantages of offender-focused 
patrol. One such example was the diffusion of crime reduction benefits. This meant that 
crime not only decreased in the targeted hot spots but also in the surrounding areas. It 
was also noted that offender-focused patrol was “less intrusive for law abiding citizens” 
as law enforcement was not focused on casting as wide a net of social control (Groff et 
al., 2015, p. 42). This in turn has the potential to increase the legitimacy of various law 
enforcement agencies, as they are effective while reducing potential negative intrusions 
on innocent citizens. The overall effect may be an increase in citizen cooperation and 
compliance with law enforcement. 
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McGarrell et al. (2007) took a different approach and focused on how 
intelligence-led policing could build on ideas present in community and problem-oriented 
policing models to prevent terrorism. They suggest that both domestic and international 
terrorism can be reduced if intelligence-led policing and practices are appropriately 
applied to the given situation. This approach is reiterated in a study by Smith, 
Damphousse and Roberts (2006), which suggests that terrorist attacks can be prevented 
by using suitable types of data and intelligence in a punctual manner. 
It is important to note, however, that McGarrell et al. (2007) encourage an all 
crimes approach when utilizing intelligence-led policing. Even if only focusing on 
reducing terror attacks, findings suggest terrorists tend to commit many other crimes. For 
example, Freilich, Chermak, and Gamarra (2006) identified over 15 other criminal acts 
that domestic terrorists routinely partake in. By addressing such crimes, law enforcement 
will be better able to monitor and/or apprehend potential terrorists. 
While addressing terrorism is a critical component of intelligence, it is only one of 
the many potential benefits that may be reaped by utilizing intelligence-led policing. 
McGarrell et al. (2007, p. 154) recognized this and conclude their study by stressing how 
an intelligence framework could help facilitate best practice which could ultimately 
improve the “effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement and the safety of 
communities and nations.” 
A Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) (2012) report further supports this notion 
with a focus on how a number of agencies have used innovative initiatives to reduce 
violent crime through the use of intelligence-led policing. This report looked at two 
sheriffs’ departments and eight police departments across eight states: Arizona, 
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California, Florida, Georgia, Oregon, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin (BJA, 2012). The 
report gave a brief assessment of each example, suggesting that all of the methods 
utilized by the selected organizations were at least somewhat effective. However, the 
extent of successful application in any of the case studies is difficult to assess due to the 
lack of any rigorous evaluation of effectiveness. 
The BJA (2012) cited these examples to demonstrate how intelligence-led 
policing can be used in a myriad of ways. One example in Phoenix was the utilization of 
multi-agency collaboration and intelligence resources, specifically the GangNet database, 
to address increasing violence caused by a resurgence in gang activity (BJA, 2012).  
Using such examples the BJA (2012) asserts that such strategies can be used to address 
both general and unique problems in effectively every type of community. 
Intelligence Efforts Abroad 
The importance of intelligence has also been demonstrated in a number of studies 
conducted abroad. While perhaps less directly relevant to issues in the United States, it is 
still useful to consider these efforts. One such example is work by Sanders, Weston and 
Schott (2015), which assessed the integration of intelligence-led policing in Canada. This 
research was conducted using 86 in-depth interviews with crime analysts, police officers 
and others working with information technology from six different police services. These 
interviews were then further supplemented by participant observation.  
Similar to findings by Schaible and Sheffield (2012) in the US, Sanders et al. 
(2015) found that Canada has been rapidly adopting intelligence-led measures for law 
enforcement. Sanders et al. (2015, p. 723) describe the ongoing development of and 
movement towards intelligence-led policing and how this has “legitimized and reinforced 
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the use of intelligence technologies.” However, while great technological progress has 
been made, it is also noted that there still needs to be a greater appreciation of 
intelligence. In particular, there must be a better understanding of “contemporary social 
control strategies” so intelligence technologies can be better utilized (Innes, Fielding & 
Cope, 2005, p. 42). Sanders et al. (2015) also recognize the importance of police culture 
and how it impacts both intelligence processes and overall strategies such as intelligence-
led policing.  
Another relevant, yet more narrowly focused study conducted abroad was that 
done by Waters (2006) in England and Wales. Waters (2006) examined the role of 
intelligence-led policing within the context of curbing juvenile crime with intensive 
supervision and surveillance programs (ISSP). In particular, Waters (2006) looked at the 
flow of intelligence between the police and those working on ISSP teams. The police 
were responsible for monitoring and researching juvenile offenders and sharing the 
intelligence gathered on them. One element of these efforts was the use of Intelligence 
Officers, who acted as liaisons for those directly involved in the ISSP. In this capacity, 
Intelligence Officers were responsible for monitoring and updating the ISSP team on 
activities of juveniles of interest the latter had identified. Such activities were further 
supplemented by the Divisional Intelligence Unit. The efforts in this study were 
measured by surveys of both officers and ISSP personnel. 
There were a number of notable conclusions. First and foremost was the 
reaffirmed belief that “police intelligence and [intelligence-led policing] will form the 
cornerstone of intervention” (Waters, 2006, p. 254). Despite some inconsistency across 
the level of intensity of the ISSP schemes, an intelligence-led intervention was 
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consistently found to be useful in combatting crimes committed by young offenders. 
Waters (2006, p. 254) concluded that “without close cooperation and intelligence from 
police … serious young offenders will remain an intractable problem.” From this we see 
how important intelligence-led strategies can be for targeting specific crimes at the local 
level. Clearly, it is not only the all crimes approach at the national level that can be 
successful. 
Limitations of Prior Research  
 Overall, significant efforts both in the United States and abroad have been 
expended in the gathering, dissemination and use of intelligence. Despite these efforts, 
studies thus far have failed to address the nature of intelligence in law enforcement, 
especially at the local level. While the few studies that do exist typically reflect 
potentially positive outcomes for using intelligence, the evaluation literature remains 
scarce. In order to truly progress with intelligence-led strategies within the law 
enforcement environment, a greater understanding of intelligence is needed at the most 
foundational level. This includes, but is not limited to, an understanding of the roles of 
intelligence personnel, the quality of the information they gather, their effectiveness and 
elements impacting their success. An understanding of such concepts should facilitate 
better intelligence-led practices that will enhance the effectiveness in law enforcement 
agencies, large and small. 
METHODOLOGY 
Program Background 
In order to begin building the foundation of knowledge required to improve 
intelligence practices in law enforcement, this study analyses the aforementioned IORs 
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submitted via Phoenix Police Department’s Intelligence Officer Program. Initiated as a 
result of cooperation between Arizona State University and the Phoenix Police 
Department, the program is designed to integrate intelligence into the patrol function and 
to ultimately make Phoenix an intelligence-led police department. Starting with only six 
officers in a pilot program in October 2014, the program expanded to 159 trained 
Intelligence Officers by the end of 2016. This includes eight permanent Intelligence 
Officers assigned to the Phoenix Intelligence Center, patrol officers from three of 
Phoenix Police Department’s seven precincts and a number of individuals from specialty 
details.1 The plan is for Intelligence Officers to be in all precincts by the end of 2017. 
The approach for facilitating intelligence gathering into the patrol function is 
relatively straightforward. It begins with Sergeants selecting patrol officers who then 
attend a weeklong Intelligence Officer School. This school covers a variety of topics 
including relevant legal issues, gangs, cartels, social media investigations, use of law 
enforcement databases that regular patrol officers do not have access to, human 
intelligence and other research resources. In addition to the school, Intelligence Officer 
training also includes ride-alongs with the permanent Intelligence Officers and time with 
Intelligence Analysts to better understand the expectations of their role.  
Intelligence Officers are utilized in a myriad of ways as was demonstrated by the 
actions of the permanent Intelligence Officers in 2016. Throughout the year, they assisted 
in 1,283 patrol requests, made 248 investigative assists, identified 865 suspects and made 
or assisted in 391 arrests. However, while officer involvement in all of these aspects is 
                                                 
1 Phoenix Police Department completed a rebid process in February 2017 in which many patrol officers 
were moved to different precincts.  Many other special unit officers, including four of the permanent 
Intelligence Officers, were also sent back to patrol. 
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important and relevant, this study focuses on the IORs submitted into the Intelligence 
Officer Reporting System. 
Data 
The purpose of the Intelligence Officer Reporting System is to create an 
interactive web of intelligence to enhance the effectiveness of the Phoenix Police 
Department (Telep & Ready, 2015). In practice, this translates to focusing on the 
systematic compilation and sharing of data. Ultimately, the aim is to assist the agency in 
both identifying and addressing crime utilizing an intelligence-led policing model. The 
finalized model should occur at the organizational level, allowing organizational 
resources to be invested in the intelligence function. However, the process starts at the 
patrol level with Intelligence Officers collecting and sharing pertinent information that 
can be used to create strategies to tackle large crime issues. 
Therefore, the reporting system is not designed for officers to record every case 
they have completed, but rather potential or ongoing cases that they deem as useful for 
either intelligence processing or storage. IORs benefitting from further processing could 
be those entailing individual cases which require additional assistance and intelligence 
analysis to identify suspects. IORs useful for storing would typically consist of those that 
include information that pertains to ongoing issues. One such example could be IORs 
containing information on a problematic organized motorcycle gang, which could be 
developed into intelligence reports for future use. It is worth noting that despite being 
provided some basic guidelines, officers have significant discretion regarding what IORs 
they submit. 
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While IORs can include a wide variety of different cases, the method with which 
they are processed is relatively standardized. It begins with an Intelligence Officer 
submitting all of the information regarding a recently initiated or potential case. After 
submission through an internal database system, each report is posted online under the 
Intelligence Officer’s corresponding patrol precinct, on the dedicated Intelligence 
Officers’ webpage. Each Intelligence Officer has open access to these reports. This 
allows officers to assist their fellow officers by adding to the information or helping 
progress cases by identifying or locating people of interest. 
The main entity responsible for processing these reports is the Phoenix 
Intelligence Center based at the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), 
the primary fusion center for the state. Here, Intelligence Analysts are responsible for 
reviewing and facilitating progress on every IORs submitted. If nothing further can be 
done with the IORs and the information is not required for an intelligence report2, it is 
given a disposition of having “No Further Information Available.” Every IORs, whether 
it progresses or not, is given a disposition and closed by an Intelligence Analyst. Each 
report is stored up to a year, after which time it is automatically deleted due to protocols 
on the sensitive information contained therein. 
For the purpose of this study, the Phoenix Police Department Information 
Technology Bureau set up Excel spreadsheets for each precinct that linked to the internet 
databases where the reports were stored. This resource holds all of the information from 
which the sample data was extracted. Following extraction of the data, I manually 
                                                 
2 Intelligence reports are distinct from IORs and have very specific standards and criteria of what they may 
contain. 
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collated, cleaned and saved it. This process was done in accordance with the Arizona 
State University Internal Review Board agreement in which all personally identifiable 
information was removed. 
 All IORs submitted between March 2015 and December 2016 were used for this 
study. The IORs collected during this 22-month period consist of 911 reports submitted 
by 115 different officers. It must be noted, however, that various levels of information 
were missing from a number of these reports so the full sample size was not utilized for 
all of the analyses. While each of the IORs contain a plethora of information that could 
be analyzed, this study focuses on the aforementioned areas of Intelligence Officer roles, 
effectiveness and perceptions. As a largely exploratory study, a large number of variables 
are examined for each component. 
 Independent variables consist of three variables used to describe Intelligence 
Officer roles and two to explore some of their perceptions on the information that they 
gather. Each of these will initially be examined in their own right to gain a greater 
appreciation of these concepts. They will then be used to predict success, the dependent 
variable, in order to make informed assertions regarding Intelligence Officer 
effectiveness. A detailed breakdown of these variables is as follows. 
Independent Variables 
Roles. The three variables utilized to describe Intelligence Officer roles are case 
categorization, the nature of crime, and information gathering methods. The first variable, 
case categorization, is utilized to demonstrate what types of cases the officers are dealing 
with. The options for Intelligence Officers to select for this variable largely reflect the 
four key areas focused on in intelligence-led policing: “crime hot spots, repeat victims, 
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prolific offenders and criminal groups” (Ratcliffe, 2016, p.5). In addition, a category for 
specific cases is also provided in the IORs. 
For IORs categorization, hot spots include those cases that occur in small defined 
areas with a high concentration of crime. The repeat victim category is represented in the 
IORs as “recurring targets” which allows the specification of both human and property 
targets. Prolific offenders and criminal groups are combined into a category labeled 
“criminal groups/repeat offenders”. The final potential categorization “specific case” is a 
catch-all category for those that did not fit in any of the aforementioned groupings. By 
analyzing the overall distribution of the sample’s categorizations, one can see the extent 
to which Phoenix Intelligence Officers play a role in the various key areas associated 
with intelligence-led policing. 
To supplement the broad assessment given by the IORs categorization, the 
subcategories of hots spots, recurring targets, criminal groups/repeat offenders and 
specific cases will also be explored. The first sub category, hot spots, looks at the 
different concentrated crime areas that Intelligence Officers may encounter in their work. 
These consist of drug activity, violent crime, property crime, and other hot spots. The 
recurring target sub-category looks at cases which have repeat victims, repeat targets 
such as a particular structure, or a combination of both. Criminal groups/repeat offenders 
consist of a wide variety of individual or group components. These include individual 
repeat offenders, gangs, criminal organizations, cartels or other. The final sub-category, 
specific crime, is similar to the hot spots categories, including drug activity, violent 
crime, property crime or other. Accounting for these subcategories serves to potentially 
enhance the understanding of cases worked by Intelligence Officers. 
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The second variable pertaining to roles of Intelligence Officers is the nature of the 
crimes on which they report. For this category, Intelligence Officers were able to select 
from seven choices when preparing their reports. These included: terrorist threat, drug 
market activity, person-on-person violence, property crime, public disorder, suspicious 
activity, or “other.” For this variable, the goal is to explore the distribution of these 
categories to demonstrate the frequency with which Intelligence Officers work these 
different types of cases. This will provide the greatest overview as it includes all cases 
regardless of their initial classification.  
In addition to examining what Intelligence Officers do, it is fundamental to 
understand how they do it. One of the more critical aspects is how they are gaining the 
information for their reports. The method of information gathering is the third and final 
variable related to Intelligence Officer roles. It can be accomplished in numerous ways 
including witnessing a crime being committed, having a report made by a citizen, or 
being requested by a sergeant to attend a scene.  
For the purpose of the IORs, Intelligence Officers are provided with seven options 
with which to designate how they retrieved or received relevant information. The choices 
are: confidential informants, personal observation, consensual contact/investigative 
detention (an open conversation in which a person is able to leave at any time/a 
temporary seizure of a person of interest), surveillance, another police officer, another 
criminal justice agency, and interview/conversation with citizen. By calculating the 
frequency with which various methods are used, there is the potential to better understand 
how Intelligence Officers are gathering information in the field. 
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Perceptions of Intelligence Officers. The second area of interest, focusing on the 
perceptions of Intelligence Officers, covers two key variables regarding IORs cases, 
namely their perceived reliability and validity. These components are essential to the 
intelligence cycle as they are considered two of the axioms of the data evaluation process 
(Peterson, 2011a, p. 83-84). Both utilize scales commonly used by organizations such as 
the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU) and the California 
Department of Justice. 
  The first component, reliability, consists of an Intelligence Officer’s rating of 
sources that provided information for their IORs. This is based on scale which can assess 
sources as reliable, usually reliable, unreliable, or unknown. This variable focuses on 
whether or not a source can be trusted. The second variable, validity, rates the 
information itself with options consisting of confirmed, probable, doubtful, or cannot be 
judged. Together, these variables demonstrate Intelligence Officer confidence regarding 
the information they are gathering, which could arguably indirectly measure the extent to 
which they see it as valuable and/or useful for the intelligence process. 
Dependent Variables 
Effectiveness of Intelligence Officers. After using the independent variables to 
establish what Intelligence Officers do and how they gather information, it is important to 
begin evaluating their effectiveness. Arguably, the best way to ascertain this is to 
examine their outcomes over the study period. This is because their actual impact in 
terms of crime prevention is too difficult to measure due to the widespread nature of their 
activities. One suitable way effectiveness can be measured is by examining the outcomes 
of the IORs. As mentioned earlier, all IORs are eventually closed and given a disposition. 
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From the dispositioning process, one can get a better idea of the number and proportion 
of IORs that have successful resolutions. To measure specific outcomes, the different 
dispositions can be broken down and examined. These include success/arrested, 
success/non-arrest, being forwarded to ACTIC Tips and Leads (reported potential threats 
to Homeland Security), being forwarded to another unit, or having no further 
information.  
After describing the proportion of IORs that fall into each of these cases, they can 
then be grouped into categories of being successful or unsuccessful. Two variations of the 
success variable will be presented. The first variation, referred to as intelligence success, 
is broad and considers all cases in which information was further utilized to be 
successful. This includes every category except cases in which no further information 
was available. These were considered unsuccessful as they became stagnant and could 
not progress any further.  
Conversely, while the second variant, referred to as case success, uses the same 
measure of lack of success, it only focuses on cases that had a distinctly successful 
outcome. For this variable, success only constitutes the categories of success/arrested or 
success/non-arrest. While an arrest is a clear measure of success, non-arrests could also 
be considered an achievement in a number of circumstances. An example of this would 
include locating a missing individual. For this variable, the remaining dispositions 
consisting of IORs that had their information forwarded to another department or ACTIC 
Tips and Leads are not deemed successful or unsuccessful as it is unknown whether the 
information provided contributed to a successful case.  These cases were dropped for 
purposes of the case success analyses.  
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Analytical Approach 
The overall approach for this study consists of two steps. The first is descriptively 
assessing all of the aforementioned independent and dependent variables in terms of the 
distribution of their responses. This will include using frequency tables to create a basic 
understanding of what Intelligence Officers do, their methodology, how confident they 
are in the caliber of the information in their cases, and how often they are successful in 
resolving them. 
The second step focuses on identifying the measures that assist in predicting the 
likelihood of success. To facilitate this component of the research, the relationship 
between the aforementioned independent variables of IORs categorization, nature of 
crime being dealt with, methods of gathering information, and perceptions of both 
reliability and validity, and the dependent variables of intelligence and case success are 
examined using cross tabs. Binary logistic regression models are then used to produce 
odds ratios to further explore each of these relationships. 
For the first set of logit models looking at IORs categorization, the earlier 
mentioned categories of hot spots, recurring targets, repeat offenders/criminal groups and 
specific crimes, in addition to cases with multiple categorizations, will be assessed to see 
the extent to which they predict intelligence and case success. For these models, the 
specific cases category will be omitted from the regression and utilized as the comparison 
group to see if either multiple categories or more precise individual ones better predict 
success. 
The second set of logit models looking at nature of crime will use six of the seven 
potential categories that Intelligence Officers can select from to predict both forms of 
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success. The categories consist of person-on-person violence, suspicious activity, drug 
market activity, terrorist threat, property crime and public disorder. The other category in 
which officers could manually enter the nature of crime was excluded to avoid any 
potential biases from interpretation, especially as multiple natures of crime could be 
reported. For these models, cases with multiple reported natures of crime are used as the 
reference group. This should allow for a comparison of different natures of crime to see 
how they individually predict success compared to using multiple methods. 
The third set of logit models looking at the impact of information gathering 
activities on both types of success utilizes three broad categories to ensure that each had a 
sufficient sample size for analysis. The three categories are: observation, consisting of 
personal observation and surveillance; official sources, made up of other police officers 
and criminal justice agencies; and civilian sources including confidential informants, 
consensual contacts/investigative detentions and interviews/conversations with citizen. 
Much like the models for nature of crime, the omitted category for these regressions is 
the cases which consist of multiple information gathering methodologies. This will allow 
a comparison to see if any of the individual methodologies predict success in a way that 
is significantly different from cases with at least one approach. 
The final models for comparing reliability and validity to intelligence and case 
success are both slightly different. Due to the distribution of cases, these models will use 
cases labeled as either fully reliable or fully valid. For these, only cases that were labeled 
as reliable or having confirmed validity were coded as 1. This could be problematic for 
reliability as this groups cases that are usually reliable with those that were unreliable or 
unknown. Similarly, for validity, cases that were coded as probably valid were grouped 
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with doubtful or unknown. However, due to the skewed distribution of cases, such an 
approach may provide insight on how complete confidence in reliability or validity 
impacts success relative to those which have any doubt. 
A set of final models will then be presented that utilize all of the earlier 
mentioned variables from this section to predict each type of success. These combined 
models will seek to identify if any potentially significant findings from the individual 
models remain significant or if any others arise in a complete model. 
RESULTS 
To examine the work of Intelligence Officers, this study begins with descriptive 
results for each of the three main components: roles, perceptions and effectiveness. 
Results are displayed with tables demonstrating the valid percentage of cases for each 
response. 
Roles of Intelligence Officers 
 Table 1, displaying the categorization of the IORs, demonstrates a few groups 
represent most of the 800 IORs characterized. The majority are classified as specific 
cases (65.4%). Combined with the next two largest categories, criminal group/repeat 
offender (12.9%) and crime hot spots (11.8%), these three categories account for roughly 
90% of the IORs. The remaining categories, multiple categorizations (7.3%) and 
recurring targets (2.8%) making up the remaining 10%. This distribution would suggest 
that Intelligence Officers spend the majority of their time on specific cases rather than on 
any particular issue. 
 What is interesting, however, is that the distribution in crime type seems to vary 
widely depending on the categorization. For example, in hot spots IORs the most 
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prevalent type of crime is drug activity (37.3%) while the least common is violent crime 
(8.5%). This trend is reversed when looking at the same types of crime for specific cases. 
When looking at individual crime types, violent crime (26.5%) is the most prevalent 
while drug activity (9.5%) is the least common. 
 The final criminal group/repeat offender and recurring target subcategories have 
different classifications and are distributed somewhat differently. For criminal 
group/repeat offender, the majority of cases included either general repeat offenders 
(39.7%) or gang members (18.4%) while the minority were from criminal organizations 
(5.9%) or cartels (3.7%). Recurring targets only made up a very small part of the sample 
but were more heavily concentrated then any of the other subcategories. For this the 
focus was undoubtedly repeat targets (76.9%), with repeat victims (10.3%) being the 
clear minority. 
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Table 1 
 
Categorization of IORs Cases3 
 
 
Categorization Category n % of Valid Cases 
 Crime Hot Spot 94 11.8 
 Criminal Group/Repeat Offender 103 12.9 
 Recurring Target 22 2.8 
 Specific Case 523 65.4 
 Multiple Categories 58 7.3 
 Total 800 100 
Crime Hot Spot    
 Drug Activity 44 37.3 
 Property Crime 15 12.7 
 Violent Crime 10 8.5 
 Other 12 10.2 
 Multiple Hot Spot Types 37 31.4 
 Total 118 100 
Criminal 
Group/Repeat 
Offender 
   
Cartel 5 3.7 
Criminal Organization 8 5.9 
Gang 25 18.4 
Repeat Offender 54 39.7 
Other 21 15.4 
 Multiple Group Types  23 16.9 
 Total  136 100 
Recurring Target    
Repeat Target 30 76.9 
Repeat Victim 4 10.3 
Repeat Target and Victim 5 12.8 
Total 39 100 
Specific Case    
 Drug Activity 47 9.5 
 Property Crime 95 19.2 
 Violent Crime 131 26.5 
 Other 181 36.6 
 Multiple Case Types 41 8.3 
 Total  495 100 
                                                 
3 Subcategory totals may differ from categorization values due to multiple categories and missing data 
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 While this broad understanding of how the IORs were distributed between 
categories is useful, it is also helpful to examine the overall breakdown of the nature of 
crime in IORs, as demonstrated in Table 2. From this, it is evident that Intelligence 
Officers deal with diverse types of crimes as no one category exceeded 20% of the cases 
and those with multiple types made up 17.6% of the sample. For individual nature of 
crimes, the most common were person on person violence (18.6%), “other” crime 
(18.0%), property crime (17.8%) and suspicious activity (14.7%). Conversely, the 
remaining three individual categories consisting of drug market activity (9.8%), public 
disorder (2.0%) and terror (1.5%) made up only 13.3% of the sample. 
Table 2 
 
Distribution of Nature of Crime for IORs 
 
 
Nature of Crime Category n % of Valid Cases 
 Drug Market Activity 80 9.8 
 Person on Person 
Violence 
152 
18.6 
 Property Crime 145 17.8 
 Public Disorder 16 2.0 
 Suspicious Activity 120 14.7 
 Terror 12 1.5 
 Other 147 18.0 
 Multiple Natures of 
Crime 
144 
17.6 
 Total 816 100 
 
 While the discussion of IORs categorization and nature of crime above provide 
great insight into the focus of Intelligence Officers, to truly appreciate their roles one 
must also have some idea of how they do their jobs. One of the key components is how 
they gather their information, which is illustrated in Table 3. 
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 Table 3 shows that in combination with multiple methods (21.2%), three other 
collection methodologies account for how information was gathered in 90.1% of the 
cases. The three primary gathering methods were interview/conversations with citizen 
(26.1%), another police officer (23.7%) and personal observation (19.1%). When the 
categories are condensed, a similar distribution is seen with civilian sources (34.3%) 
being the largest contributor followed by official sources (25.3%) and observation 
(21.1%). This would suggest that the majority of information that Intelligence Officers 
utilize for the IORs, roughly 59.6%, is obtained through interaction with others rather 
than through their own observation. 
Table 3 
 
Distribution of Information Gathering Methods for IORs 
 
 
Information 
Gathering 
Methods 
Category n % of Valid Cases 
Another Criminal Justice Agency 10 1.1 
Another Police Officer 208 23.7 
 Confidential Informant 16 1.8 
 Consensual Contact/Investigative 
Detention 
47 5.4 
 Interview/Conversation with Citizen 229 26.1 
 Personal Observation 168 19.1 
 Surveillance 14 1.6 
 Multiple Methods 186 21.2 
 Total 878 100 
Information 
Gathering 
Methods - 
Condensed 
   
Civilian 301 34.3 
Observation 185 21.1 
Official 222 25.3 
Multiple Methods 170 19.4 
 Total 878 100 
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Overall, descriptive analysis of the role data indicates that Intelligence Officers 
most often work specific cases, the nature of crimes they deal with are usually related to 
person on person violence, “other” crime, property crime or suspicious activity, and that 
most of their information is gathered by interacting with citizens or other law 
enforcement personnel. 
Perceptions of Intelligence Officers 
In addition to understanding the roles of the Intelligence Officers, it is also 
important to know how they perceive the information they are gathering and the cases 
they are working. In terms of the information itself, Intelligence Officers seem to be 
relatively confident in the quality of data being collected. This is demonstrated by the 
results for both reliability and validity, displayed in table 4.  
In addressing only cases that were deemed fully reliable or fully valid, 80% of 
cases were deemed to come from a reliable source while 55.3% were asserted to have 
fully valid information. Even more impressive is when “usually reliable” and “probably 
valid” cases are included. The result then reflects 86.6% of sources being classified as at 
least usually reliable and 92.7% of cases having at least probably valid information. 
Together these figures would suggest that Intelligence Officers have confidence in the 
majority of their sources and information. Such findings are not unexpected when 
considering the discretion Intelligence Officers have in selecting cases to be submitted as 
IORs. 
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Table 4 
 
Perceptions on Reliability and Validity of IORs 
 
 
Reliability Category n % of Valid Cases 
 Reliable 695 80.0 
 Usually Reliable 57 6.6 
 Unreliable 5 0.6 
 Unknown 112 12.9 
 Total 869 100 
Validity    
 Confirmed 446 55.3 
 Probable 302 37.4 
 Doubtful 4 0.5 
 Cannot Be Judged 55 6.8 
 Total 807 100 
Full Reliability    
 Fully Reliable 695 80.0 
  Other  174 20.0 
Total 869 100 
Full Validity    
 Fully Valid 446 55.3 
Other 361 44.7 
 Total  807 100 
 
Effectiveness of Intelligence Officers 
With an appreciation of both Intelligence Officer roles and information quality 
established, it is imperative to explore the effectiveness of the officers in producing 
impactful outcomes. A key way to measure effectiveness is to directly look at the 
dispositions of the IORs themselves. As shown in Table 5, three dispositions account for 
90.3% of the data. These are referred to other unit (42.1%), no further information 
(30.3%) and success/arrested (17.9%). Of these, referred to other unit is an intelligence 
success, no further information is a non-success, and success/arrested is both an 
intelligence and case success. 
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When looking at the cases in terms of whether or not they were successful, results 
differ for the two types of success. As shown in Table 6, the broader measure, 
intelligence success, demonstrates a positive result in 69.7% of the cases. This is in 
contrast to case success which only has a positive result in 39.0% of the cases. Such 
outcomes would suggest that while cases may not always be distinctly successful in 
tangible terms, the majority of cases provide useful information and the potential for 
future case successes. 
Table 5 
 
Closing Dispositions of IORs 
 
 
Category 
ACTIC Tips & Leads 
Intelligence Report Submitted 
No Further Information 
Referred to Other Unit 
Success/Arrested 
Success/No Arrest 
Total 
n % of Valid Cases 
65 7.4 
8 0.9 
266 30.3 
370 42.1 
157 17.9 
13 1.5 
879 100 
 
Table 6 
 
Classification of Intelligence Officer Success 
 
 
Intelligence Success Category n % of Valid Cases 
 Non-Success 266 30.3 
 Success 613 69.7 
 Total 879 100.0 
Case Success    
 Non-Success 266 61 
  Success 170 39 
  Total 436 100 
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Success of Intelligence Officers 
 As a general description of roles, perceptions of information, and effectiveness 
have been established, it is important to assess how roles and perceptions may contribute 
to effectiveness by predicting either intelligence or case successes. More specifically, this 
section examines the impact of case categorization, nature of crime, information 
gathering methodologies and both full reliability and full validity on each type of success.  
This is accomplished through the creation of cross tabs and logistic regressions to 
produce odds ratios. One important note, however, is that for the purpose of the cross tabs 
case successes that are typically nested in intelligence successes were excluded from 
these. This was done to more accurately depict the breakdown of the data. To appreciate 
intelligence successes as they are earlier defined, all that has to be done is to add case and 
intelligence successes together. 
Tables 7 and 8 examine the relationship between case categorization and 
intelligence and case successes. Table 7 demonstrates that for every categorization, at 
least two thirds of cases could be classified as some form of success. The highest 
combined success rate was for criminal group/repeat offenders (78.4%) while the lowest 
was for recurring targets (66.7%). Conversely, cases with a criminal group/repeat 
offender (22.7%) had the highest percentage of case successes for an individual type of 
case, while recurring targets had the lowest (4.8%). 
To see if the different categorizations were significantly different in predicting 
success, odds ratios were generated, comparing all categories to specific cases, as this 
was a catch-all category that did not pertain to any of the more focused categorization 
types. From these analysis, displayed in Table 8, the only statistically significant result 
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was that criminal group/repeat offender cases were 1.98 times more likely to be an 
intelligence success than a specific case. This would suggest that in all other scenarios, 
specific cases are just as likely to predict intelligence or case success than those with 
multiple categorizations or any other one type. 
Table 7 
 
Crosstab of Categorization and Success 
Category Non-Success Intelligence Success Case Success Total 
Crime Hot Spots 24 
25.5% 
54 
57.4% 
16 
17.0% 
94 
100% 
Criminal Group/ 
Repeat Offender 
21 
21.6% 
54 
55.7% 
22 
22.7% 
97 
100% 
Recurring Target 7 
33.3% 
13 
61.9% 
1 
4.8% 
21 
100% 
Specific Case 178 
35.4% 
226 
44.9% 
99 
19.7% 
503 
100% 
Multiple 13 
22.8% 
30 
52.6% 
14 
24.6% 
57 
100% 
Note. Each cell provides both the n and corresponding row percentage 
 
 
Table 8 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for Categorization and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Crime Hot Spot 1.597 
(0.406) 
1.199 
(0.415) 
Criminal Group/Repeat Offender 1.982** 
(0.522) 
1.884 
(0.621) 
Recurring Target 1.095 
(0.517) 
0.257 
(0.276) 
Multiple 1.854 
(0.610) 
1.936 
(0.784) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 772     Case Success=395 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0124      Case Success=0.0160 
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To test this assertion Tables 9 and 10 were produced to display a crosstab and 
logistic odds ratios to see if cases with multiple categorizations were significantly 
different from single categories when predicting success. The result was as earlier 
demonstrated with no significant difference with having multiple categories for either 
intelligence or case successes. 
 
Table 9 
 
Crosstab of Count of Categories and Success 
Category Non-Success Intelligence Success Case Success Total 
One Category 230 
32.2% 
347 
48.5% 
138 
19.3% 
715 
100% 
Multiple Categories 13 
22.8% 
30 
52.6% 
14 
24.6% 
57 
100% 
Note. Each cell provides both the n and corresponding row percentage 
 
 
Table 10 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for Count of Categories and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Multiple Categories 1.605 
(0.523) 
1.795 
(0.718) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 772     Case Success=395 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0024      Case Success=0.0040 
 
The second analyses of this section, consisting of Tables 11 through 14, examine 
the relationship between the nature of crime and intelligence and case successes. Table 11 
demonstrates that for every nature of crime, at least half of cases could be classified as 
some form of success. The highest combined success rate was for terror cases (91.6%) 
while the lowest was for public disorder (50.1%). In terms of case successes, person on 
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person violence (29.8%) had the highest percentage of success for an individual type of 
case, while public disorder had the lowest (6.3%). 
To see if different natures of crime were significantly different in predicting 
success, odds ratios were generated, comparing all different natures of crime to those 
which had multiple natures of crime. This was to examine if any particular type of nature 
of crime was a greater predictor of success by itself than cases that included several of 
these. From the analysis, displayed in Table 12, there were a number of statistically 
significant results. The most significant was that person on person violence was roughly 
2.16 times less likely to result in an intelligence success than multiple natures of crime. 
While this was highly statistically significant at a level of p < 0.001, there was no similar 
result for case successes. 
The other significant findings for this variable were all at a significance level of p 
< 0.05. In regards to nature of crime and intelligence successes, there were two other 
relevant findings. These were that property crime and disorder were, respectively, 1.60 
and 3.12 times less likely to predict intelligence success than multiple natures. Like 
person on person violence, neither of these findings had similar results for case successes. 
There were also two significant results in the logistic regression examining nature 
of crime and case successes. The findings suggested that suspicious activity and drug 
market activity were about 2.87 and 3.36 times less likely to be a case success than cases 
with multiple nature of crime types. Once again, these findings were not consistent for 
intelligence successes. Overall, these findings suggest that cases with multiple natures of 
crime are more likely to be categorized as a success.  
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Table 11 
 
Crosstab of Nature of Crime and Success 
Category Non-Success Intelligence Success Case Success Total 
Drug Market Activity 25 
32.1% 
47 
60.3% 
6 
7.7% 
78 
100% 
Person on Person 
Violence 
62 
41.1% 
44 
29.1% 
45 
29.8% 
151 
100% 
Property Crime 47 
34.1% 
56 
40.6% 
35 
25.4% 
138 
100% 
Public Disorder 8 
50.0% 
7 
43.8% 
1 
6.3% 
16 
100% 
Suspicious Activity 32 
27.1% 
77 
65.3% 
9 
7.6% 
118 
100% 
Terror 1 
8.3% 
10 
83.3% 
1 
8.3% 
12 
100% 
Multiple 30 
21.3% 
87 
61.7% 
24 
17.0% 
141 
100% 
Note. Each cell provides both the n and corresponding row percentage 
 
Table 12 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for Nature of Crime and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Drug Market Activity 0.683 
(0.191) 
0.298* 
(0.146) 
Person on Person Violence 0.462*** 
(0.100) 
0.901 
(0.241) 
Property Crime 0.624* 
(0.142) 
0.924 
(0.267) 
Public Disorder 0.322* 
(0.167) 
0.155 
(0.167) 
Suspicious Activity 0.866 
(0.217) 
0.349* 
(0.146) 
Terror 3.543 
(3.734) 
1.241 
(1.769) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 788     Case Success=393 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0209      Case Success=0.0325 
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To verify this finding, an additional crosstab and logistic regression are provided 
in Tables 13 and 14 to determine if cases with multiple natures of crime were 
significantly more likely to predict success. As shown in Table 14, cases with multiple 
crime types were 1.80 times more likely to predict intelligence success than cases with an 
individual nature. However, there was no significant difference between individual and 
multiple natures for case successes. 
Table 13 
 
Crosstab of Count of Nature of Crime and Success 
Category Non-Success Intelligence Success Case Success Total 
Single Nature 175 
34.1% 
241 
47.0% 
97 
18.9% 
513 
100% 
Multiple Natures 30 
21.3% 
87 
61.7% 
24 
17.0% 
141 
100% 
Note. Each cell provides both the n and corresponding row percentage 
 
Table 14 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for Count of Natures of Crime and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Multiple Natures 1.803** 
(0.401) 
1.335 
(0.395) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 788     Case Success=393 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0078      Case Success=0.0018 
 
The third analyses of this section, consisting of Tables 15 and 16, examine the 
relationship between the information gathering methodology and intelligence and case 
successes. Table 15 demonstrates that for every information gathering methodology, at 
least two thirds could be classified as some form of success. The highest combined 
success rate was for multiple methodologies (72.8%) while the lowest was for civilian 
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(67.9%). In terms of case successes official sources (27.4%) have the highest percentage 
of case successes while civilian (11.8%) have the lowest. 
To discern if different information gathering methods were significantly different 
in predicting success, odds ratios were generated, comparing all different cases with 
individual methods to those which used multiple. This was done as the comparison would 
make it possible to see if any particular type of information gathering method was a 
greater predictor of success by itself than cases that included several of these. From the 
analysis, displayed in Table 16, there was only one statistically significant result and this 
was at a significance level of p < 0.01. Cases with only civilian sources were 2.59 times 
less likely than cases with multiple sources to predict case success. This would suggest 
that all other sources are not significantly different in predicting either type of success. 
Table 15 
 
Crosstab of Information Gathering Methodologies and Success 
Category Non-Success Intelligence Success Case Success Total 
Civilian 95 
32.1% 
166 
56.1% 
35 
11.8% 
296 
100% 
Observation 51 
29.3% 
95 
54.6% 
28 
16.1% 
174 
100% 
Official 66 
30.7% 
90 
41.9% 
59 
27.4% 
215 
100% 
Multiple 44 
27.2% 
76 
46.9% 
42 
25.9% 
162 
100% 
Note. Each cell provides both the n and corresponding row percentage 
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Table 16 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for Information Gathering Methodologies and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Civilian 0.789 
(0.170) 
0.386** 
(0.113) 
Observation 0.899 
(0.218) 
0.575 
(0.184) 
Official 0.842 
(0.194) 
0.937 
(0.263) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 847     Case Success=420 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0013      Case Success=0.0279 
  
To verify this finding, a crosstab was created and a logistic regression was conducted, as 
shown in Tables 17 and 18. This was done to see if the use of multiple sources for 
predicting success was significantly different from individual ones. Interestingly, the 
results in Table 18 suggest that cases using multiple sources are 1.66 times more likely to 
be case successes than cases utilizing only one type of method. This could suggest a 
broader impact rather than just the single significant category from the previous 
regression. As expected based on the prior results, the same trend was not present for 
intelligence successes. 
Table 17 
 
Crosstab of Count of Information Gathering Methodologies and Success 
Category Non-Success Intelligence Success Case Success Total 
One Source  212 
30.9% 
351 
51.2% 
122 
17.8% 
685 
100% 
Multiple Sources 44 
27.2% 
76 
46.9% 
42 
25.9% 
162 
100% 
Note. Each cell provides both the n and corresponding row percentage 
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Table 18 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for Multiple Information Gathering Methodologies and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Multiple Sources 1.202 
(0.234) 
1.659* 
(0.404) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 847     Case Success=420 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0009      Case Success=0.0076 
 
The fourth set of analyses, consisting of Tables 19 through 22, examine the 
relationship between both full reliability and full validity and intelligence and case 
successes. The crosstabs in Tables 19 and 20 demonstrate that full reliability and full 
validity are associated with success. For example, 71.3% of fully reliable cases are 
successful compared to 63.2% of not fully reliable cases. Similarly, 70.4% of fully valid 
cases are successful compared to 67.5% of those that are not fully valid.  
The differences between these cases are even more pronounced when looking 
only at case successes. 21.9% of fully reliable cases are case successes compared to only 
8.8% of not fully reliable cases. Similarly, 28.2% of fully valid cases are case success 
compared to only 9.1% of not fully valid cases. 
To see if full reliability and validity predict success in a regression model, odds 
ratios were generated. From the analysis, displayed in Table 21, we see that full 
reliability is significant in predicting both intelligence and case successes. Cases rated by 
Intelligence Officers as fully reliable are 1.45 times more likely to predict intelligence 
success than not fully reliable cases. The magnitude of the odds ratio is greater for case 
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success. Fully reliable cases are 3.21 times more likely than non-fully reliable cases to be 
case successes at a significance level of p < 0.001.  
Table 22 illustrates that unlike for full reliability, cases rated as fully valid only 
significantly predicted case success. These fully valid cases were 3.39 times more likely 
to predict case success than cases that were not fully valid. This was also at a significance 
level of p < 0.001.  These findings reflect that having a fully reliable source is a strong 
predictor of both intelligence and case success while validity only strongly predicts case 
success. 
Table 19 
 
Crosstab of Full Reliability and Success 
Category Non-Success Intelligence Success Case Success Total 
Fully Reliable 191 
28.7% 
329 
49.4% 
146 
21.9% 
666 
100% 
Not Fully Reliable 63 
36.8% 
93 
54.4% 
15 
8.8% 
171 
100% 
Note. Each cell provides both the n and corresponding row percentage 
 
 
Table 20 
 
Crosstab of Full Validity and Success 
Category Non-Success Intelligence Success Case Success Total 
Fully Valid 127 
29.6% 
181 
42.2% 
121 
28.2% 
429 
100% 
Not Fully Valid 114 
32.5% 
205 
58.4% 
32 
9.1% 
351 
100% 
Note. Each cell provides both the n and corresponding row percentage 
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Table 21 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for Full Reliability and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Fully Reliable 1.451* 
(0.261) 
3.210*** 
(0.988) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 837     Case Success=415 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0041      Case Success=0.0303 
 
 
Table 22 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for Full Validity and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Fully Valid 1.144 
(0.178) 
3.394*** 
(0.804) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 780     Case Success=394 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0009      Case Success=0.0076 
 
The final tables produced demonstrate complete models that incorporate all of the 
odds ratios discussed thus far. These were estimated to observe what variables arose or 
remained as significant in predicting success when all independent variables were 
accounted for. Table 23, which includes all of the individual variables with the exception 
of the specific crime category, illustrates only two findings from the earlier models 
remain significant. First, cases solely focused on person on person violence were 2.05 
times less likely to be an intelligence success. Second, fully valid cases were 2.45 times 
more likely to be a case success. 
The model displayed in Table 24 estimates the odds ratios for all of the multiple 
variables, along with full reliability and full validity. No new significant results occurred 
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in this model; however, it did reiterate the earlier finding that having multiple natures of 
crime is significant in increasing the likelihood that a case will predict an intelligence 
success. This was slightly lower than in the model only looking at multiple natures of 
crime, decreasing from 1.80 to 1.70 times. The finding that fully valid cases better 
predicted case successes was also once again reiterated with an estimated improvement of 
2.65 times.  
Table 25 summarizes the results from the full models in Tables 23 and 24, to 
illustrate which categories remained statistically significant for either type of success 
when all independent variables were accounted for. This included three key categories: 
person on person violence, multiple natures of crime and full validity. From these results, 
it is demonstrated that multiple natures of crime is most consistently related to predicting 
intelligence success, while full validity is most consistently predictive of case success. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  43 
Table 23 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for All Variables and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Crime Hot Spot 1.581 
(0.466) 
1.624 
(0.678) 
Criminal Group/Repeat Offender 1.597 
(0.470) 
1.886 
(0.764) 
Recurring Target 1.020 
(0.507) 
0.214 
(0.236) 
Multiple Categories 1.610 
(0.573) 
1.896 
(0.854) 
Drug Market Activity 0.616 
(0.193) 
0.401 
(0.215) 
Person on Person Violence 0.487** 
(0.118) 
0.971 
(0.311) 
Property Crime 0.621 
(0.156) 
1.093 
(0.374) 
Public Disorder 0.581 
(0.346) 
0.283 
(0.321) 
Suspicious Activity 1.081 
(0.336) 
0.522 
(0.258) 
Terror 1.735 
(1.930) 
1.632 
(2.421) 
Civilian 0.980 
(0.254) 
0.544 
(0.198) 
Observation 0.736 
(0.221) 
0.510 
(0.208) 
Official 0.892 
(0.245) 
0.797 
(0.198) 
Fully Reliable 1.353 
(0.350) 
1.224 
(0.509) 
Fully Valid 1.027 
(0.216) 
2.459** 
(0.780) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 632     Case Success=326 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0209      Case Success=0.0325 
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Table 24 
 
Logistic Odds Ratios for Multiple Variables, Full Reliability, Full Validity and Success 
Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Multiple Categories 1.382 
(0.482) 
1.717 
(0.743) 
Multiple Natures 1.698* 
(0.404) 
0.938 
(0.764) 
Multiple Sources 1.080 
(0.245) 
1.532 
(0.446) 
Fully Reliable 1.320 
(0.318) 
1.391 
(0.549) 
Fully Valid 0.970 
(0.196) 
2.654** 
(0.808) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 632     Case Success=326 
Pseudo R2: Intelligence Success =0.0110      Case Success=0.0593 
 
Table 25 
 
Summary of Significant Logistic Odds Ratios for Full Models 
Category Reference Category Intelligence Success Case Success 
Person on Person 
Violence 
Multiple Natures of 
Crime 
0.487** 
(0.118) 
0.971 
(0.311) 
Multiple Natures of 
Crime 
Individual Natures 
of Crime 
1.698* 
(0.404) 
0.938 
(0.764) 
Fully Valid 
(Table 23) 
Not Fully Valid 
(Individual Model) 
1.027 
(0.216) 
2.459** 
(0.780) 
Fully Valid 
(Table 24) 
Not Fully Valid 
(Multiple Model) 
0.970 
(0.196) 
2.654** 
(0.808) 
Note. Standard errors are displayed in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
n: Intelligence Success= 632     Case Success=326 
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DISCUSSION 
With limited research on the utilization of intelligence in law enforcement and no 
known studies on Intelligence Officers, this thesis has sought to begin building a 
foundation of knowledge on the latter. Both descriptive and inferential analyses have 
been utilized to accomplish this goal. 
Lessons from Descriptive Data 
From the descriptive analyses, much can be inferred regarding the roles, 
perceptions and effectiveness of Intelligence Officers. In terms of their roles, the data 
suggests that most attention is on specific crimes rather than focused issues such as 
criminal groups/repeat offenders, recurring targets and hot spots. It is unknown, however, 
whether this is due to the roles of the officers or their existing training. As the 
Intelligence Officer Program has evolved, there has been a reduced focus on addressing 
crime issues outside of specific crimes. This has the potential to change as advanced 
classes currently being planned concentrate on some of these more sophisticated issues. It 
is very possible that such training could shift the focus on specific crimes to more chronic 
crime problems. 
 Over and above the categorization of cases on which Intelligence Officers focus, 
the descriptive information also provided useful insight into the nature of these cases. 
Cases focus on a relatively diverse spectrum of crimes including person on person 
violence, property crimes and cases with multiple different natures. It is unclear what 
dictates this variety, but this is likely tied to the ways in which Intelligence Officers 
gather information for cases that are deemed to be potentially intelligence-related. It may 
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also be a reflection of the fact that Intelligence Officers can be approached by other patrol 
officers for assistance in many different kinds of cases. 
 In terms of information gathering methodologies, the descriptive data suggests 
that Intelligence Officers largely rely on three key sources: another police officer, 
interview/conversation with a citizen, and personal observation. What is perhaps more 
interesting is that the majority of Intelligence Officer information generally comes from 
other official sources or civilians. This may suggest that Intelligence Officers are largely 
reactive and that many potential intelligence leads occur as a result of their daily 
interactions with both entities. Such a result is not unexpected considering that in the 
Phoenix Intelligence Officer Program, most of the trained officers are first and foremost 
patrol officers. It is therefore positive to see potentially useful information being shared 
and acted upon by these officers. Furthermore, the Intelligence Officers seem to perceive 
this information as generally coming from reliable sources and typically being valid. 
 The descriptive analysis showed that 69.7% of cases are intelligence successes 
and 39% are tangible case successes, suggesting that Intelligence Officers are making 
some sort of positive contribution. While there is no known comparison group for the 
Phoenix Intelligence Officers, nor is it plausible to measure their absence, they are 
bringing more attention to cases than what they would have previously received.  This is 
due to the fact that officer submissions to the IORs system gain exposure to a network of 
Intelligence Officers as well as dedicated Intelligence Analysts. Without such attention, it 
is unlikely that the cases within the sample would have been resolved with as much 
success as they have. 
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Variables Impacting Success 
With this in mind, it is important to understand what may enhance the likelihood 
of success so that effectiveness can be maximized. This study has attempted to look at 
both Intelligence Officer roles and perceptions to see how these may significantly 
contribute. For the individual logistic regression models, a number of variables were 
statistically significant, either for intelligence or case success but not both. The exception 
was cases where the Intelligence Officer deemed the information gathered fully reliable.  
However, in the final models which accounted for all of the variables discussed, 
only three remained statistically significant for predicting success, and each of these only 
for one type of success. The first of these findings was that cases that focus on person on 
person violence are less likely to be an intelligence success than cases that have multiple 
natures of crime. The second and related finding is that cases with multiple natures of 
crime are more likely to be an intelligence success. While it is somewhat intuitive that a 
multi-faceted crime should be easier to follow up due to more information likely being 
available and the possibility of more police units becoming involved, it is unknown why 
this does not translate to an increased likelihood of case success. 
The last major finding that remained significant for the final models was that 
cases where the information was deemed fully valid by an Intelligence Officer had an 
increased likelihood of being a case success. Once again, this is rather intuitive as more 
valid or accurate information should increase the ability to obtain a tangible outcome 
such as an arrest. However, it is unknown as to why fully valid information would not 
also be a predictor of greater potential for an intelligence success. Therefore, both 
significant findings require further study to try and identify the mechanisms through 
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which multiple natures of crime and full validity increase the likelihood for their 
respective type of success. 
Limitations 
While these findings are thought-provoking and merit further investigation, it is 
advisable that caution be taken in interpreting the results as this study did have some 
limitations. First and foremost is the issue of nested data. As earlier mentioned, 115 out 
of the 159 trained Intelligence Officers submitted IORs. What is more concerning, 
however, is that just 16 officers were responsible for 51% of the sample and 65 officers 
for 90%. As a result of this, the findings may not be overly representative of the 
Intelligence Officers as a whole but instead a smaller, perhaps more dedicated subgroup 
that is driving the program. It will be important to monitor this concentration of 
participation to see how it affects the program as it continues. Furthermore, future studies 
will need to utilize multilevel modeling to account for the issue of IORs being nested.  
In addition to nesting problems, there were also issues with incomplete, missing 
or other data that was incorrectly classified. This was largely a result of the collection 
method which relied on officer data entry. While such methods naturally have the ability 
to cause issues, these could be potentially reduced. For example, the Intelligence Officer 
Reporting System would benefit from the utilization of mandatory fields and reduction of 
“other” options in which officers can manually enter data. This could be beneficial to 
both the intelligence program and further research efforts as it should result in more 
complete and accurate data. 
A third limitation that requires acknowledgement for this particular study is the 
definitions of success. While case successes are straightforward and distinct, the idea of 
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intelligence successes are much less so. The key reason is that intelligence success 
incorporates many cases in which the outcomes are unknown, such as when cases are 
forwarded to other departments. This may not inherently be a limitation yet it must be 
recognized that such a measure does not provide a full picture in terms of outcomes. In 
addition, the pseudo-variance explained in the models presented were relatively low, 
suggesting that there are most likely other factors for explaining success that have not 
been accounted for. 
The final potential limitation that necessitates attention is external validity. 
Phoenix Police Department’s Intelligence Officer Program is both unique and progressive 
with no known viable comparison. To this end caution must be taken in trying to 
generalize the results to other Intelligence Officers, especially as most tend to have this as 
a primary job rather than a secondary responsibility. To rectify this potential issue, 
replications of this study with different programs and in other cities would help ascertain 
generalizability. Furthermore, despite potential external validity issues the Phoenix 
Program does offer a great starting point for beginning to focus on how intelligence is 
and can be used within law enforcement. Additionally, a Bureau of Justice Assistance 
grant currently funding the expansion of the program will allow for continued data 
collection and assessment of a myriad of outcomes. 
Future Research 
  Given both the limitations of this study and the dearth of knowledge and 
literature on intelligence, there is a great need for future research. While some 
preliminary findings on Intelligence Officer roles, perceptions and effectiveness are 
offered here, more must be done to expand on the topic. In particular, focusing on what 
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Intelligence Officers can contribute could have very practical implications for those 
agencies considering whether to utilize such positions within their organization. Once 
benefits have been critically established, research could be initiated regarding the crafting 
of Intelligence Officer roles to either more specific or broad functions. Research should 
also seek to investigate the disproportionate submission of reports by officers and how 
the top submitters differ from others as this could significantly enhance officer selection 
for intelligence programs. 
 In addition to a greater understanding of their roles, it is imperative that future 
research identifies how the effectiveness of Intelligence Officers could be improved. 
While the exploratory research in this foundational study reflected cases with multiple 
natures of crime better predicted intelligence success and validity better predicted case 
success, these preliminary findings are likely just beginning to scratch the surface. Future 
research must identify other significant contributory factors to success and then explore 
how these might be enhanced. 
CONCLUSION 
The utilization of intelligence and intelligence personnel in law enforcement is a 
key modern development that has been largely under-researched by academics. Despite 
the lack of documented studies, it is crucial to evaluate such concepts to better understand 
how agencies can be intelligence-led. This is critical when evidence, such as that from 
this study, demonstrates that intelligence personnel have the ability to significantly 
enhance departmental success. More must be done to understand the potential of these 
personnel so that organizations can optimize the way in which Intelligence Officers are 
utilized for maximum benefit and efficiency.  
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APPENDIX A: IORS FORM 
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1. IO Name    
 
2. Date of Report 
 
3. IORs Number (will be automatically set when form is saved) 
  
4. CAD Incident Number  
 
5. Squad Area   
 
6. Title   
 
7. Category 
A. Criminal Group / Repeat Offender 
 Repeat Offender (check box) 
  Name, Date of Birth (DOB),  
  Terror Threat? 
  Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) check complete? 
   Level of threat 
Gang Name 
Cartel 
Criminal Organization 
Other (Specify) 
B. Recurring Target 
Repeat Victim 
 Name, DOB 
Repeat Target   
 Residence 
  Address 
Commercial establishment 
 Name, Address 
Physical target 
 Description, address/approximate location 
C. Crime Hot Spot  
Hot Spot Type 
Drug Activity, Violent Crime, Property Crime, Other 
D. Specific Case  
Crime Type 
Drug Activity, Violent Crime, Property Crime, Other 
Suspect (If Known), Name, DOB  
Location Address/Intersection   
 
8. At what approximate address or intersection was this intelligence gathered?  (Include 
closest intersection) 
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9. What was the nature of the activity that you observed or information you gathered?  
Terrorist threat, Drug market activity, Person-on-person violence, Property crime, 
 Public disorder, Suspicious Activity, Other 
 
 10. Provide a brief narrative of the intelligence gathered 
 
 11. How did you gather this piece of intelligence? (Check all that apply) 
Confidential Informant, Personal Observation, Consensual Contact / Investigative 
Detention, Surveillance, Another Police Officer, Another Criminal Justice 
Agency, Interview / Conversation with Citizen 
 
12. How would you rate the source of this information?   
(Reliable/usually reliable/unreliable/unknown) 
12a. State reason for rating  
12b. Source's Motivation   
 
13. How would you rate the validity of this information?   
 (Confirmed/probable/doubtful/cannot be judged) 
13a. State reason for rating  
 
14. How many people is this situation affecting?   
 (One person/small group/whole community/unknown) 
 
15. Do you think the focus of your intelligence gathering is for a larger recurring problem 
that should be a candidate for a team-based response?  
Yes/No/Unsure (more investigation needed) 
 
16. To your knowledge, is this IORs report linked to another IORs report? 
Yes/No 
IORs Number(s) –  
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17. What actions did you take based on this intelligence? (Check all that apply) 
A. Made an arrest 
Name     DOB   
B. Wrote a citation 
Name     DOB  
C. Gave a verbal warning 
Name     DOB (if known)   
D. Wrote a field contact report 
FI#   
E. Wrote an intelligence report 
IRRR#  
F. Wrote a departmental/incident report 
DR# 
 G. Submitted tip to ACTIC Tips & Leads System 
ACTIC # 
 H. Interviewed/followed up with a suspect(s) or potential suspect(s)  
Name     DOB   
I. Interviewed/followed up with a victim 
Name  
J. Interviewed/followed up with a citizen 
Name  
K. Followed up with another criminal justice agency 
Name  
L. Other resources used 
Internal  
External  
M. Other (Specify)  
 
18. Did another IORs report make it possible for you to take any of these actions?   
 Yes/No  
IORs Number (s) 
 
19. What are your suggestions on how to proceed with this situation in the long-term?  
 
 20.  POST COMMENTARY / FEEDBACK HERE. CITE YOUR NAME, SERIAL #, 
DATE, AND TIME WHEN POSTING. 
 
Reviewed by, Assigned To (serial # & Last Name), Status, Date completed  
Disposition   
ACTIC Tips & Leads 
Intelligence Report Submitted 
Linked to other IORs 
No Further Information 
 Referred to Other Unit 
Success (Success/No Arrest, Success/Arrested, Arrested) 
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APPENDIX B: IRB APPROVAL 
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